.. _network_005ftls: TLS setup for network services ------------------------------ Almost all network services in QEMU have the ability to use TLS for session data encryption, along with x509 certificates for simple client authentication. What follows is a description of how to generate certificates suitable for usage with QEMU, and applies to the VNC server, character devices with the TCP backend, NBD server and client, and migration server and client. At a high level, QEMU requires certificates and private keys to be provided in PEM format. Aside from the core fields, the certificates should include various extension data sets, including v3 basic constraints data, key purpose, key usage and subject alt name. The GnuTLS package includes a command called ``certtool`` which can be used to easily generate certificates and keys in the required format with expected data present. Alternatively a certificate management service may be used. At a minimum it is necessary to setup a certificate authority, and issue certificates to each server. If using x509 certificates for authentication, then each client will also need to be issued a certificate. Assuming that the QEMU network services will only ever be exposed to clients on a private intranet, there is no need to use a commercial certificate authority to create certificates. A self-signed CA is sufficient, and in fact likely to be more secure since it removes the ability of malicious 3rd parties to trick the CA into mis-issuing certs for impersonating your services. The only likely exception where a commercial CA might be desirable is if enabling the VNC websockets server and exposing it directly to remote browser clients. In such a case it might be useful to use a commercial CA to avoid needing to install custom CA certs in the web browsers. .. _tls_cert_file_naming: Certificate file naming ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In a simple setup, where all QEMU instances on a machine share the same TLS configuration, it is suggested that QEMU certificates be kept in either ``/etc/pki/qemu`` or, for unprivileged users, in ``$HOME/.pki/qemu``. Where different QEMU subsystems require different certificate configurations, sub-dirs of these locations may be chosen. The default file names that QEMU will traditionally load are: * ``ca-cert.pem`` - mandatory; for both client and server configurations * ``ca-crl.pem`` - optional; for server configurations only * ``server-cert.pem`` - mandatory; for server configurations only * ``server-key.pem`` - mandatory; for server configurations only * ``client-cert.pem`` - optional; for client configurations only * ``client-key.pem`` - optional; for client configurations only * ``dh-params.pem`` - optional; for server configurations only Since QEMU 10.2.0, there is support for loading upto four additional identities: * ``server-cert-[IDX].pem`` - optional; for server configurations only * ``server-key-[IDX].pem`` - optional; for server configurations only * ``client-cert-[IDX].pem`` - optional; for client configurations only * ``client-key-[IDX].pem`` - optional; for client configurations only where ``-[IDX]`` is one of the digits 0-3. Loading will terminate at the first absent index. The index based certificate files may be used as a replacement for, or in addition to, the traditional non-index based certificate files. The traditional certificate files will be loaded first, if present, then the index based certificates. Where multiple certificates are compatible with a TLS session, the first loaded certificate will preferred. IOW file naming can influence which certificates are used for a session. The use of multiple sets of certificates is intended to allow an incremental transition to certificates using different crytographic algorithms. This allows a newly deployed QEMU to introduce use of stronger cryptographic algorithms that will be preferred when talking to other newly deployed QEMU instances, while retaining compatbility with certificates issued to a historically deployed QEMU. This is notably useful to support live migration from an old QEMU deployed on older operating system releases, which may support fewer crypto algorithm choices than the current OS. The certificate creation commands below will be illustrated using the traditional naming scheme, but their args can be substituted to use the indexed naming in the obvious manner. .. _tls_005fgenerate_005fca: Setup the Certificate Authority ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This step only needs to be performed once per organization / organizational unit. First the CA needs a private key. This key must be kept VERY secret and secure. If this key is compromised the entire trust chain of the certificates issued with it is lost. :: # certtool --generate-privkey > ca-key.pem To generate a self-signed certificate requires one core piece of information, the name of the organization. A template file ``ca.info`` should be populated with the desired data to avoid having to deal with interactive prompts from certtool:: # cat > ca.info < server-hostNNN.info < server-hostNNN-key.pem # certtool --generate-certificate \ --load-ca-certificate ca-cert.pem \ --load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem \ --load-privkey server-hostNNN-key.pem \ --template server-hostNNN.info \ --outfile server-hostNNN-cert.pem The ``dns_name`` and ``ip_address`` fields in the template are setting the subject alt name extension data. The ``tls_www_server`` keyword is the key purpose extension to indicate this certificate is intended for usage in a web server. Although QEMU network services are not in fact HTTP servers (except for VNC websockets), setting this key purpose is still recommended. The ``signing_key`` keyword is the key usage extension to indicate this certificate is intended for usage in the data session. The ``server-hostNNN-key.pem`` and ``server-hostNNN-cert.pem`` files should now be securely copied to the server for which they were generated, and renamed to ``server-key.pem`` and ``server-cert.pem`` when added to the ``/etc/pki/qemu`` directory on the target host. The ``server-key.pem`` file is security sensitive and should be kept protected with file mode 0600 to prevent disclosure. .. _tls_005fgenerate_005fclient: Issuing client certificates ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ The QEMU x509 TLS credential setup defaults to enabling client verification using certificates, providing a simple authentication mechanism. If this default is used, each client also needs to be issued a certificate. The client certificate contains enough metadata to uniquely identify the client with the scope of the certificate authority. The client certificate would typically include fields for organization, state, city, building, etc. Once again on the host holding the CA, create template files containing the information for each client, and use it to issue client certificates. :: # cat > client-hostNNN.info < client-hostNNN-key.pem # certtool --generate-certificate \ --load-ca-certificate ca-cert.pem \ --load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem \ --load-privkey client-hostNNN-key.pem \ --template client-hostNNN.info \ --outfile client-hostNNN-cert.pem The subject alt name extension data is not required for clients, so the ``dns_name`` and ``ip_address`` fields are not included. The ``tls_www_client`` keyword is the key purpose extension to indicate this certificate is intended for usage in a web client. Although QEMU network clients are not in fact HTTP clients, setting this key purpose is still recommended. The ``signing_key`` keyword is the key usage extension to indicate this certificate is intended for usage in the data session. The ``client-hostNNN-key.pem`` and ``client-hostNNN-cert.pem`` files should now be securely copied to the client for which they were generated, and renamed to ``client-key.pem`` and ``client-cert.pem`` when added to the ``/etc/pki/qemu`` directory on the target host. The ``client-key.pem`` file is security sensitive and should be kept protected with file mode 0600 to prevent disclosure. If a single host is going to be using TLS in both a client and server role, it is possible to create a single certificate to cover both roles. This would be quite common for the migration and NBD services, where a QEMU process will be started by accepting a TLS protected incoming migration, and later itself be migrated out to another host. To generate a single certificate, simply include the template data from both the client and server instructions in one. :: # cat > both-hostNNN.info < both-hostNNN-key.pem # certtool --generate-certificate \ --load-ca-certificate ca-cert.pem \ --load-ca-privkey ca-key.pem \ --load-privkey both-hostNNN-key.pem \ --template both-hostNNN.info \ --outfile both-hostNNN-cert.pem When copying the PEM files to the target host, save them twice, once as ``server-cert.pem`` and ``server-key.pem``, and again as ``client-cert.pem`` and ``client-key.pem``. .. _tls_005fcreds_005fsetup: TLS x509 credential configuration ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ QEMU has a standard mechanism for loading x509 credentials that will be used for network services and clients. It requires specifying the ``tls-creds-x509`` class name to the ``--object`` command line argument for the system emulators. Each set of credentials loaded should be given a unique string identifier via the ``id`` parameter. A single set of TLS credentials can be used for multiple network backends, so VNC, migration, NBD, character devices can all share the same credentials. Note, however, that credentials for use in a client endpoint must be loaded separately from those used in a server endpoint. When specifying the object, the ``dir`` parameters specifies which directory contains the credential files. This directory is expected to contain files with the names mentioned previously, ``ca-cert.pem``, ``server-key.pem``, ``server-cert.pem``, ``client-key.pem`` and ``client-cert.pem`` as appropriate. While it is possible to include a set of pre-generated Diffie-Hellman (DH) parameters in a file ``dh-params.pem``, this facility is now deprecated and will be removed in a future release. When omitted the DH parameters will be automatically negotiated in accordance with RFC7919. The ``endpoint`` parameter indicates whether the credentials will be used for a network client or server, and determines which PEM files are loaded. The ``verify`` parameter determines whether x509 certificate validation should be performed. This defaults to enabled, meaning clients will always validate the server hostname against the certificate subject alt name fields and/or CN field. It also means that servers will request that clients provide a certificate and validate them. Verification should never be turned off for client endpoints, however, it may be turned off for server endpoints if an alternative mechanism is used to authenticate clients. For example, the VNC server can use SASL to authenticate clients instead. To load server credentials with client certificate validation enabled .. parsed-literal:: |qemu_system| -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/etc/pki/qemu,endpoint=server while to load client credentials use .. parsed-literal:: |qemu_system| -object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/etc/pki/qemu,endpoint=client Network services which support TLS will all have a ``tls-creds`` parameter which expects the ID of the TLS credentials object. For example with VNC: .. parsed-literal:: |qemu_system| -vnc 0.0.0.0:0,tls-creds=tls0 .. _tls_005fpsk: TLS certificates for Post-Quantum Cryptography ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Given a new enough gnutls release, suitably integrated & configured with the operating system crypto policies, QEMU is able to support post-quantum crytography on TLS enabled services, either exclusively or in a hybrid mode. In exclusive mode, only a single set of certificates need to be configured for QEMU, with PQC compliant algorithms. Such a QEMU configuration will only be able to interoperate with other services (including other QEMU's) that also have PQC enabled. This can result in compatibility concerns during the period of transition over to PQC compliant algorithms. In hybrid mode, multiple sets of certificates need to be configured for QEMU, at least one set with traditional (non-PQC compliant) algorithms, and at least one other set with modern (PQC compliant) algorithms. At time of the TLS handshake, the GNUTLS algorithm priorities should ensure that PQC compliant algorithms are negotiated if both sides of the connection support PQC. If one side lacks PQC, the TLS handshake should fallback to the non-PQC algorithms. This can assist with interoperability during the transition to PQC, but has a potential weakness wrt downgrade attacks forcing use of non-PQC algorithms. Exclusive PQC mode should be preferred where both peers in the TLS connections are known to support PQC. Key generation parameters ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ To create certificates with PQC compliant algorithms, the ``--key-type`` argument must be passed to ``certtool`` when creating private keys. No extra arguments are required for the other ``certtool`` commands, as their behaviour will be determined by the private key type. The typical PQC compliant algorithms to use are ``ML-DSA-44``, ``ML-DSA-65`` and ``ML-DSA-87``, with ``ML-DSA-65`` being a suitable default choice in the absence of explicit requirements. Taking the example earlier, for creating a key for a client certificate, to use ``ML-DSA-65`` the command line would be modified to look like:: # certtool --generate-privkey --key-type=mldsa65 > client-hostNNN-key.pem The equivalent modification applies to the creation of the private keys used for server certs, or root/intermediate CA certs. For hybrid mode, the additional indexed certificate naming must be used. If multiple configured certificates are compatible with the mutually supported crypto algorithms between the client and server, then the first matching certificate will be used. IOW, to ensure that PQC certificates are preferred, they must use a non-index based filename, or use an index that is smaller than any non-PQC certificates. ie, ``server-cert.pem`` for PQC and ``server-cert-0.pem`` for non-PQC, or ``server-cert-0.pem`` for PQC and ``server-cert-1.pem`` for non-PQC. Force disabling PQC via crypto priority ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ In the OS configuration for system crypto algorithm priorities has enabled PQC, this can (optionally) be overriden in QEMU configuration disable use of PQC using the ``priority`` parameter to the ``tls-creds-x509`` object:: NO_MLDSA="-SIGN-ML-DSA-65:-SIGN-ML-DSA-44:-SIGN-ML-DSA-87" NO_MLKEM="-GROUP-X25519-MLKEM768:-GROUP-SECP256R1-MLKEM768:-GROUP-SECP384R1-MLKEM1024" # qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,endpoint=server,dir=....,priority=@SYSTEM:$NO_MLDSA:$NO_MLKEM TLS Pre-Shared Keys (PSK) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Instead of using certificates, you may also use TLS Pre-Shared Keys (TLS-PSK). This can be simpler to set up than certificates but is less scalable. Use the GnuTLS ``psktool`` program to generate a ``keys.psk`` file containing one or more usernames and random keys:: mkdir -m 0700 /tmp/keys psktool -u rich -p /tmp/keys/keys.psk TLS-enabled servers such as ``qemu-nbd`` can use this directory like so:: qemu-nbd \ -t -x / \ --object tls-creds-psk,id=tls0,endpoint=server,dir=/tmp/keys \ --tls-creds tls0 \ image.qcow2 When connecting from a qemu-based client you must specify the directory containing ``keys.psk`` and an optional username (defaults to "qemu"):: qemu-img info \ --object tls-creds-psk,id=tls0,dir=/tmp/keys,username=rich,endpoint=client \ --image-opts \ file.driver=nbd,file.host=localhost,file.port=10809,file.tls-creds=tls0,file.export=/